The authors show how the influence of extrinsic random signals depends on the noise structure of these signals. They present an experiment on a coordination game in which extrinsic random signals may generate sunspot equilibria. They measure how these signals affect behavior. Sunspot equilibria emerge naturally if there are salient public signals. Highly correlated private signals may also cause sunspot-driven behavior, even though this is no equilibrium. The higher the correlation of signals and the more easily these can be aggregated, the more powerful these signals are in moving actions way from the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Introduction
Since Keynes (1936) compared investor behavior in stock markets to a beauty contest, the question has been asked whether extrinsic information may affect agents' behavior. Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983) were the first to theoretically explore the influence of extrinsic information on economic activities. They showed that whenever there are multiple equilibria there are also sunspot equilibria, in which agents condition their actions on publicly observable but intrinsically uninformative signals. 1 Despite the uninformative nature of these signals, they may serve as focal points for agents' beliefs, and their public nature allows for beliefs that are conditioned on these signals to become self-fulfilling.
Therefore, extrinsic events may determine on which particular equilibrium agents coordinate upon.
Whether sunspot equilibria emerge naturally and how the likelihood for observing sunspot equilibria depends on the nature of signals is an increasingly relevant question, as financial crises might emerge from sudden swings of expectations triggered by extrinsic signals. In the field, arguably it is hard to identify a particular extrinsic event that may affect an agent's choice. Even if such an extrinsic event is identified, it is difficult to establish causality between the extrinsic event (sunspot) and an economic outcome. For instance, noninformative signals might explain excessive asset price volatility when traders condition their actions on such signals, but higher volatility may also be caused by an increasing dispersion of private signals or increasing uncertainty. 2 Laboratory experiments offer a 1 The term sunspot originated in the work of William Jevons (1884) , who proposed a relationship between the number of sunspots and the business cycle. In the theoretical literature, the term "sunspot" is a synonym for extrinsic random variables, i.e., variables that may influence economic behavior, but are unrelated to fundamentals such as payoffs, preferences, technologies, or endowments. 2 A related recent literature in financial economics explores the impact of natural activities, such as weather conditions or lunar phases, on mood and subsequently on investment decision (see, e.g., Yuan, Zheng and Zhu, 2006; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2007 , and references therein) or on college choice (Simonsohn, 2009) . Mood might also be reflected in confidence indices, such as the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index or the Ifo Business Climate Index, which contain some information about the future path of household spending. Others have shown that sports events impact stock-market indices (Edmans, Garcia and Norli, 2007) or expectations about the future personal situation and the economic situation in general (Dohmen et al., 2006) . However, in this literature it is difficult to argue that these events do not affect preferences or do not have direct effects on utility. Individuals also often show a tendency to incorporate irrelevant information into their decision, although it is not controlled environment that permits a systemic exploration of the impact that extrinsic information has on economic behavior.
In this paper, we present an experiment that reliably produces sunspot-driven behavior without explicitly priming or recommending that subjects follow extrinsic signals.
We observe that different groups of subjects coordinate on different sunspot equilibria and we test how the noise structure of sunspot variables affects behavior. While previous experimental studies, particularly Duffy and Fisher (2005) , provide evidence that extrinsic random signals may indeed affect subjects' behavior (at least after some training), little is known about how the impact of extrinsic signals depends on their noise structure, meaning the number of signals, the signal distribution, and whether these signals are publicly observable. To our knowledge, no previous experiment could implement a sunspot equilibrium without a training period where subjects were exposed to the relationship of the sunspot variable with a market outcome or without framing these variables as explicit recommendations, and no previous experiment has generated different sunspot equilibria under the same external conditions.
We use a simple two-player coordination game with random matching. In this game players simultaneously pick a number from the interval between zero and 100. The two players maximize their payoffs by choosing the same number, while deviations are punished with a quadratic loss function. Each coordinated number selection constitutes a Nash equilibrium and payoffs do not depend upon the number that players coordinate on.
However, the game has a risk-dominant equilibrium (picking "50") which provides a natural focal point in the absence of a coordination device. 3 profitable for them, for example in financial or innovation decisions (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber, 1989 , Jamison, Owens and Woroch, 2009 , or Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2010 . 3 In the pure coordination game in our baseline setting, the notion of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) provides a natural way to break the payoff symmetry and thus may serve as a focal point. Indeed, Schelling's (1960) focal point concept originated from situations where the game's formal structure provides no guidance for equilibrium selection, such as in a pure coordination game. For experimental studies of the focal point concept see, for example, Mehta, Starmer and Sudgen (1994) , Bosch-Domenech and Vriend (2008) , Bardsley et al. (2009), Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (2009) or Agranov and Schotter (2010) . Crawford and Haller (1990) show theoretically how players can coordinate via precedents when they lack a common-knowledge description of the game in a repeated setting (see also Blume and Gneezy, 2000 , for an experimental test).
In our experiment, extrinsic signals (sunspots) are binary random variables unrelated to payoffs, with realizations being either zero or 100. 4 These signals have two properties that we exploit. First, signals are semantically meaningful because they clearly map to the action space. Previous research has shown that when it comes to generating sunspot equilibria, semantically meaningful signals can be much more effective in the lab. Such signals can be easily used as coordination devices and provide a second focal point in addition to the riskdominant equilibrium. It is an empirical question whether risk dominance or (public) signals are better focal points for subjects. Second, the semantically meaningful signals are extreme in the sense that they point towards the lowest or highest possible action, thereby maximizing the tension between different focal points. As the risk-dominance criterion allows us to order the different equilibria by their distance from 50, we can measure the power of sunspots by how distant actions are from the risk-dominant equilibrium.
We systematically vary the noise structure, meaning the number of signals, their distribution, and their degree of public availability. For each treatment, we measure the average distance between the chosen actions and the risk-dominant strategy and the portion of groups that converge to sunspot equilibria. Thus, we investigate to what extent publicly available information is necessary for sunspot-driven behavior to occur, and how subjects aggregate the available information.
Our first main finding is that extrinsic public signals that are easily aggregated lead to almost perfect coordination on the sunspot equilibrium that is implied by the semantics of the signals. This salient sunspot equilibrium reliably shows up when subjects just receive public signals, even when the sunspot equilibrium is associated with higher strategic risk than any other strategy. Coordination on the salient sunspot equilibrium is less pronounced when public and private signals are both present, as some subjects then condition their actions on the private signal, which either prevents full coordination of actions or leads to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium. While theory predicts the same set of equilibria as in a game with just one public signal, we find that the power of sunspots is significantly lower if 4 A sunspot may be anything that coordinates the expectations of market participants and breaks the symmetry in coordination problems. For example, Schelling speculated in his seminal book on strategic conflicts that "Most situations … provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person's expectations of what the other expects him to be expected to do" (1960, 57) . Such clues might include folk wisdom, public recommendations, collective perception, consensus, stereotypes, or (strategy) labels.
private and public signals are combined. When subjects receive both public and private signals, we also observe that different groups of subjects coordinate on different equilibria for the same external conditions.
In the absence of public signals, the risk-dominant equilibrium predominates.
However, sunspot-driven behavior can be observed for highly correlated private signals.
This observation indicates that the likelihood of sunspot-driven actions may be a continuous function of the correlation of signals, while equilibrium theory predicts that sunspot-driven behavior can occur only if the signals from different agents are perfectly correlated.
The occurrence of sunspot-driven behavior or sunspot equilibria largely depends on the distribution of strategies in the early periods of the game. In treatments in which different groups coordinate on different equilibria, we detect a significant correlation between behavior that occurred during the first and last periods of the game. This finding is in line with previous results on coordination games such as Beil (1990, 1991) .
In our coordination game, sunspot equilibria are not associated with welfare losses; in fact all equilibria yield identical payoffs. However, our setup allows us to isolate the welfare effects of the miscoordination induced by extrinsic information. We find that subjects' payoffs are U-shaped in the power of sunspots, measured by how distant the actions are from the risk-dominant equilibrium, and hence, we find significant differences in average payoffs between treatments. Miscoordination arises from (i) a slower convergence process towards a common strategy or a lack of convergence and (ii) coordination on a nonequilibrium strategy, particularly if sunspot-driven behavior imposes negative externalities on agents who do not receive signals. Both channels relate to or can be thought of as the costs arising from a lack of understanding whether or not to condition actions on the signals received and how to aggregate information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the related literature. Section 3 introduces the game and theoretical considerations. Section 4 outlines the design of the experiment and derives hypotheses from theory. The results are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Although experiments provide a useful tool for investigating sunspot behavior, to date only a few studies have done so. The first attempt to investigate sunspots in the laboratory was Marimon, Spear, and Sunder (1993) . They implemented an overlapping generations economy, where the sunspot was a blinking square on the subjects' computer screens that changed its color: red in odd and yellow in even periods. In the first periods the size of a generation (fundamental variable) varied between odd and even periods, which constituted an endowment shock and led to a unique equilibrium with alternating high and low prices.
After 16 to 20 periods, the endowment shock was eliminated by keeping the generation size fixed, which induced multiple equilibria, one stationary and one a two-period cycle. In four out of five sessions, subjects continued to alternate their price forecasts, but the price paths substantially diverged from the predicted sunspot equilibrium. It is not clear whether the alternating predictions were just carried over from the subjects' experiences in the first phase or whether the blinking square had any effect on their behavior. Duffy and Fisher (2005) were the first to provide direct evidence for the occurrence of sunspots. They investigated whether simple announcements like "the forecast is high (low)" can generate sunspots in a market environment with two distinct equilibrium prices. They found that the occurrence of sunspot equilibria depends on the market institution's particular information structure. Sunspots always affected behavior in less informative call markets while in more informative double auction markets sunspots mattered only in four out of nine cases. A second interesting finding of this study is the importance of the semantics of the sunspot variable. If people do not share a common contextual understanding and hence do not interpret the sunspot in the same way, it is highly likely that the sunspot variable does not matter. In order to achieve a common understanding of the sunspot variable, the subjects in Duffy and Fisher (2005) were alerted to the existence of high and low price equilibria in combination with the respective announcement in an initial training phase. In sessions with announcements like "the forecast is sunshine (rain)" and without training subjects to relate these announcements to high or low prices, sunspots did not occur. In our experiment, sunspots are semantically salient and sunspot equilibria arise endogenously without any need of training. Beugnot et al. (2009) explored the effect of sunspots in a setting with a payoffdominant equilibrium. They used a three-player, two-action coordination game with two equilibria-"work" or "strike"-where "work" is payoff-dominant, weakly risk-dominant, and maximin. Their sunspot variable was a random announcement of "work" or "strike."
They found that subjects did not coordinate on a sunspot equilibrium. Instead, there was some convergence towards the efficient non-sunspot equilibrium. This indicates that it may be difficult to generate sunspot equilibria against a focal point that combines payoff dominance with risk dominance.
There is also some experimental work on correlated equilibrium, a concept that is closely related to sunspot equilibrium (see e.g., Peck and Shell, 1991) . For instance, Cason and Sharma (2007) found that subjects tend to follow public third-party recommendations of a correlated equilibrium with higher average payoffs than any Nash equilibrium. Cason and Sharma taught subjects that it is in their interest to follow recommendations provided that their respective partners do so, and they compared strategic games with situations in which subjects played against machines known to invariably follow the "recommendation." On average, about 80% of all subjects followed the recommendations (more so when they were playing against a machine) and achieved higher payoffs than those that did not receive recommendations. In a related experiment, Duffy and Feltovich (2010) also found that subjects conditioned their behavior on a third-party recommendation if the recommendation was associated with higher than Nash equilibrium payoffs but that subjects learned to ignore bad or nonequilibrium recommendations. Both studies used binary action games. Cason and Sharma (2007) attributed the behavior of subjects who did not follow recommendations to a lack of confidence that their partner would follow the recommendations.
Some related experiments explored subjects' responses to the recommendation of a pure strategy equilibrium in games with multiple equilibria (for example, Brandts and Holt, 1992; Brandts and MacLeod, 1995; Kuang, Weber and Dana, 2007; Van Huyck, Gilette and Battalio, 1992) . 5 Although third-party recommendations can be seen as extrinsic signals, they differ considerably from the signals generated in our experiment. Framing a message as 5 While the recommendations in these experiments mostly come from the experimenter, there are also experiments where advice is given by players of a previous cohort participating in the experiment (see, e.g., Sopher, 2003 or Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher, 2009 , for such "intergenerational" advice in coordination games).
advice sent by someone conveys the idea that following the recommendation is in the recipients' interest. In our experiment, the signal is just a random device without an associated intention and the payoffs are the same, regardless of whether the subjects follow a public signal or coordinate on another equilibrium. Moreover, our experiment also explores situations with privately observed signals, while in these earlier experiments recommendations are always public information. One important finding of this literature is that subjects only follow "credible" recommendations: for example, subjects tend to disregard advice to play an imperfect or a less efficient equilibrium. By contrast, our results show that subjects may follow a random coordination device, even if it is riskier to do so and even if such behavior is no equilibrium.
The Game
The game we will analyze is a pure coordination game. It can be considered as a reduced form of a market setting in the spirit of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) . Two agents independently and simultaneously pick an action
where
is a twice continuous differentiable function with 0 0 x x f , 0 0 f , and x x f 0 . Therefore, agent i maximizes her payoff when she matches agent j's action.
An agent is penalized for a deviation from her partner's pick by the concave payoff function f; the loss grows more than proportionally in the distance between the two chosen actions.
Clearly, any coordinated pick of numbers constitutes a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, both agents receive the same payoff and, moreover, the payoff is exactly the same in all equilibria.
Equilibria with Signals
Let us now extend this game by introducing payoff-irrelevant information which can be public, private, or both. is an equilibrium, provided that both agents follow the same function and, thus, are always perfectly coordinated.
While it is not necessary to assume that the payoff function is continuous and differentiable, we do so for ease of presentation. The assumption that P assigns a strictly positive probability to each element of , , can also be relaxed. In general, the result holds as long as one's private signal does not perfectly reveal the other agent's signal, in which case the private signal would be public information. Concavity, on the other hand, is an important assumption, as the following counter-example shows.
Suppose that the payoff function for both players is linear in differences, i.e., 
Riskiness of Equilibria
Due to the large set of equilibria, it is natural to use some selection criteria. One of the most widely used criteria to assess the risk of different equilibria is given by risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . In its original formulation, risk dominance is a binary relation that does not provide any strict order on the equilibria of our game. There is, however, an alternative notion of risk dominance in which, according to Harsanyi and Selten's heuristic justification, the selected equilibrium results from postulating an initial state of uncertainty where the players have uniformly distributed second-order beliefs on all equilibria. Each player believes that the other players' beliefs are uniformly distributed on the set of equilibrium strategies, which in our case is the entire action space. Throughout the rest of the paper, we will refer to this alternative notion simply as risk dominance. 6
Another alternative selection criterion is the notion of secure action (see Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990) . Based on the maximin criterion of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), a secure action is one that maximizes the minimum possible payoff. 7
Lemma 2 characterizes our game's risk-dominant equilibrium and secure action. Note that this equilibrium is independent of the generated signals. Proof: see Appendix A.
Lemma 2 shows that the strategy of choosing the interval's midpoint is both the secure action and the risk-dominant equilibrium. By choosing this midpoint, an agent minimizes the maximum possible distance to his partner's choice and can assure himself a minimum payoff of f ((c-b) /2). In addition, selecting the midpoint is also the best response to the belief that the actions of others are uniformly distributed on [b, c] or, alternatively, to the belief that the strategies of others are uniformly distributed on the entire set of all possible strategies.
Unlike for Lemma 1, concavity is not a necessary condition for Lemma 2 to hold. 6 Among other experimental studies, this alternative notion has been used in Haruvy and Stahl (2004) . 7 The secure action does not need to belong to the support of Nash equilibria. In our game, though, it trivially does, because the support of Nash equilibria coincides with the whole set of actions. The security criterion has also been applied to a game after the deletion of non-equilibrium actions (see, e.g., Haruvy and Stahl, 2004 ).
Both selection criteria can order the different equilibria. According to the notion of secure action, one strategy is riskier than another if it can lead to a lower payoff. According to the notion of risk dominance, one equilibrium will be riskier than another if the expected payoff against a uniform distribution over all equilibrium strategies is lower. In the absence of public signals or in the case of two public signals in which the equilibrium is symmetric with respect to the two signals, both measures of risk can be expressed as a function increasing in the absolute distance to (b+c)/2. Therefore, throughout the rest of the paper, we will interpret the absolute distance to (b+c)/2 as a measure of risk. We will say that an extrinsic signal or a combination of extrinsic signals exerts a stronger effect on behavior than another combination, if (after some convergence) the average distance of the chosen actions from the midpoint (b+c)/2 is higher. Alternatively, we can say that given two information structures, one structure is more likely to produce sunspot-driven behavior than the other if the fraction of groups converging to a sunspot equilibrium or to a sunspot-driven nonequilibrium strategy is larger in that structure compared to the other treatment.
Experimental Design, Procedures and Hypotheses

Game Setup
In all the experimental treatments, the subjects repeatedly played the coordination game explained above. The subjects were randomly assigned to matching groups of six that were fixed throughout a session. In each period, we randomly matched the subjects into pairs within a matching group. There was no interaction between the subjects from different matching groups and, thus, we can treat the data from different matching groups as independent observations. The subjects were aware that in each period they were randomly matched with another subject from their matching group and that they would never face the same subject twice in a row.
The subjects had to choose, independently and simultaneously, an integer at or between 0 and 100. The players' payoffs depended on the distance between their own and their partner's choice. In particular, the payoff function was the following: Note: *common signal revealed to each subject with 90% probability Subjects could earn a maximum of 200 points if their actions perfectly matched and for a deviation between their choices they were penalized by the quadratic loss term. 8 It is easy to check that this payoff function fulfills the properties of the function characterized in the previous section, so that both Lemma 1 and 2 apply. 9
Treatments
In the benchmark treatment (Treatment N), subjects played the coordination game with payoff function (2) and received no extrinsic information. In all the other treatments, the subjects received some extrinsic information (signals) and we varied their public nature and the number of signals. Extrinsic information was generated as follows. In each period, the computer draws a random number 100 , 0 Z . Both numbers are equally likely and the realization is not disclosed to the subjects (except for one treatment). Instead, each subject in a pair receives at least one independently drawn signal s.
With probability 1 , 5 . 0 p this signal s is the same as the random number Z, that is,
Probability p measures the precision of signals and is one of our treatment variables. 10 The more precise the signals are, the higher is the correlation between two independently drawn signals, and the greater is the likelihood that both signals are the same. In treatments with private signals, each subject received an independently drawn signal that was not revealed to the other player. Public signals were revealed to both players in a pair and the subjects knew that each of them received the same signal. We also varied the number of signals that subjects received. In some treatments, the subjects received either a private or a public signal, and in two treatments, they received two signals: either one public and one private signal or two public signals. Table 1 gives an overview of the different treatments.
In Treatments P75 and P95, both subjects in a pair received independently drawn private signals, X1 and X2. The only difference between these two treatments is the probability with which signal Xi coincides with the number Z. In P75, this probability is p = 0.75, while in P95, it is p = 0.95. Therefore, in P75 subjects received the same signal in 62.5% of the cases, while in P95 this probability is 90.5%. Sunspot equilibria do not exist for private signals with p < 1 (see Lemma 1). With p = 1, the private signal in fact becomes a common (public) signal and sunspot equilibria do exist. Hence, the set of equilibria is discontinuous in p and by changing the precision of signals we can test this theoretical prediction.
In Treatment AC, the random number Z was revealed to each subject with probability p = 0.9. We call this signal "almost common information," as it generates common p-beliefs (with p = 0.9) in the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989) . This treatment allows an alternative test of whether behavior is discontinuous in p, as predicted by the theory. In Treatment AC, no sunspot equilibrium exists since the information is not disseminated to all subjects with probability 1.
In Treatment C, both subjects in a pair received a public signal Y with p = 0.75. Since it was common information that both subjects received the same signal, sunspot equilibria exist. Any function 100 , 0 : Y f is an equilibrium. 11 In Treatment CC, the subjects received two independently drawn public signals Y1 and Y2, both with p = 0.75. Here, any function f mapping pairs of (Y1,Y2,) to the interval [0,100] is an equilibrium. In Treatment CP, the subjects received both a public and a private signal. The public signal Y and both subjects' private signals X1 and X2 were drawn independently. The probability of a signal coinciding with Z was p = 0.75 for each signal. Subjects were always informed which signal conveyed public and private information. Again, subjects could ignore the private signal and condition their behavior on the public signal that allowed for sunspot equilibria. As in Treatment C, any function 100 , 0 : Y f is an equilibrium.
Procedure
Subjects played the game for 80 periods. After each period, they learned their partner's choice, the distance between their own choice and their partner's choice, and the resulting payoff. They also learned the realization of the random variable Z, except for Treatment N.
In treatments with private signals (P75, P95, CP), they never learned their partners' private signal.
The general procedure was the same in each session and treatment. At the beginning of a session, the subjects were seated at computer stations in random order. The instructions were distributed and read out aloud, and if a player had any questions, these were answered in private. Throughout the sessions, the subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another and could not see each other's screens. They were not informed about the identity of their partner or the other members of their matching group. In the instructions, the payoff function (2) was explained in detail and was also displayed as a mathematical function and as a nonexhaustive payoff table. 12 Before starting the experiment, subjects had to answer questions about the game's procedures and in particular how the payoffs were determined.
We had three reasons for implementing this quiz. First, we wanted to make sure that the subjects understood how their payoff would be determined. Second, we wanted to alert the subjects to the fact that neither the number Z nor the signals would affect their payoff, and third, the quiz also ensured that the subjects could clarify any last-minute questions and gain confidence that the other players understood the game. 13 Once all subjects had answered the questions correctly, the experiment started.
We ran a total of 17 sessions with 18 subjects in each session, except for three sessions of Treatment N that had only 12 subjects. The sessions took place at the Technical University Berlin and in total 288 students, mainly undergraduate majors from various fields (engineering, business administration, mathematics, chemistry, etc.) participated. They were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . The experiments were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . At the end of a session, we determined the subjects' earnings by randomly selecting 10 out of the 80 periods for payment. The subjects were then paid in private, where the points earned in the selected periods were converted to euros (1 point = 1 euro cent). In addition subjects received a fee of 3 euros for showing up. A session lasted about one hour and the subjects on average earned 21 euros.
Hypotheses
The results from previous studies and the game theoretic analysis in section 3 provide some hypotheses for the different treatments that we summarize in this subsection. The first hypothesis relates to the treatment with no signals:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Without additional information (treatment N), subjects coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Hypothesis 1 means that in the absence of signals, subjects will converge to playing 50. As previously emphasized, any coordinated pick constitutes an equilibrium. However, different notions of equilibrium selection point to this particular equilibrium. Besides being risk dominant, choosing the midpoint of the interval is the unique symmetric equilibrium according to the theory of focal points by Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2008) , and constitutes the best response to a random choice by the other player.
Previous studies pointed out that the occurrence of sunspot equilibria hinges on agents' shared beliefs, so these studies implemented a training phase to let these shared beliefs develop (see, e.g., Duffy and Fisher, 2005 Our design gives us two measures for the power of sunspots: one is the number of groups in each treatment who coordinate on strategies that are driven by sunspots, the other measure is the average distance of chosen actions from 50, the midpoint. In line with H2 and H3 we state the following hypothesis regarding the power of sunspots:
Hypothesis 4 (H4):
The proportion of groups converging to a sunspot driven strategy and the average distance of actions from 50 are independent of the probability that both subjects receive the same signal.
The alternative hypothesis is that the power of an extrinsic signal rises when the probability is greater that the other player receives the same signal. This probability is 0.625 in Treatment P75, around 0.9 for Treatments P95 and AC (conditional on receiving a signal) 14 , and 1.0 for Treatment C.
14 The probability for another subject receiving the same signal is 0.905 in Treatment P95 and 0.9 in Treatment AC. Getting these numbers as close as possible was the reason why we chose p = 0.9 in AC.
When two signals are received, it may be more difficult for the subjects to agree on a common sunspot strategy than if they receive one unique signal. Here, the focal sunspot In any equilibrium, the subjects' actions are perfectly coordinated, yielding the highest possible payoff, which is the same in all treatments. Thus, if the signals' structure does not affect the ability of subjects to coordinate on an equilibrium, the payoffs should be the same across treatments:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The average payoffs are the same in all treatments.
In experiments, one cannot expect that the subjects' actions are in equilibrium from the start of a session. Since the game is rather simple, we expected, however, that each matching group would converge to an equilibrium or at least to a common strategy. The speed of convergence, however, may be related to the treatments. Because more signals result in a more complex strategy set, the number of signals may reduce the speed of convergence and, thereby, the overall efficiency. For comparing public and private signals, there are two theoretical arguments pointing in opposite directions. On the one hand, any public signal increases the dimension of the equilibrium set. This may make it more difficult for group members to coordinate on any particular equilibrium. On the other hand, a private signal for each player increases the dimension of the set of states of the world (signal combination) more than a public signal. In addition, agents never learn their partner's signal-or whether their partner received a signal at all (in AC). This makes it more difficult for subjects to assign an observed action to a particular strategy.
Results
We start analyzing the data by checking whether the subjects within a matching group converged to a common strategy and by identifying the strategies on which they converged.
This analysis also allows a first test of the hypotheses H1 to H5. Then, we show how to use the distance of choices from the risk-dominant equilibrium as a measure of the sunspots' power. We use this measure to perform a detailed analysis of the differences in behavior across treatments.
Convergence and Identified Strategies
For checking whether groups converged to a common strategy and to which strategies they converged in the different treatments, we introduce two convergence criteria.
The strong convergence criterion requires that all six subjects in a matching group play according to the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±1, for periods 70-79. The weak convergence criterion requires that at least four subjects in a matching group follow the same strategy, allowing a deviation of ±3, for periods 70-79. 15 If a group converged to a common strategy, we identify the strategy to which it converged by the choices of the majority of subjects who fulfilled the respective convergence criterion. Table 2 gives a first impression of results in the different treatments. For converging groups, we identify four types of strategies they coordinated on: 1) "50:" the risk-dominant strategy; 2) intermediate sunspot strategies, such as "25/75" or "10/90," in which subjects choose the lower number when the signal is 0 and the higher number when the signal is 100; 3) "0/100:" follow the signal; 4) "Mean;" play the average of both signals. In Treatment CP, strategies of types 2) and 3) refer to the public signal only. Table 2 summarizes how many groups converged according to our two criteria detailed for the identified strategies. First, we note that except for Treatment CP all groups but one converged to one of the identified strategies at least according to the weak convergence criterion. In Treatment CP only eight out of 12 groups weakly converged. While 15 We do not include period 80, because some subjects deviate exclusively in the last period. Tables C1 and C2 in the appendix show more detailed results including the period in which a certain group convergences to a particular strategy according to the strong and weak convergence criterion. Coordinated groups 5 (6) 5 (6) 3 (5) 5 (6) 4 (6) 6 (8) 4 (6)
Strategies:
"50" 5 (6) 5 (6) 3 4 -1 - In order to simplify our remaining analysis, we checked whether the subjects' strategies were symmetric. In other words, whether subjects who chose m a i when they received signal s = 0 played m a i 100 when their signal was s = 100. 16 In Appendix B, we show that symmetry not only applies to the strategies subjects converged to; it also applies to actions played during the entire experiment. We therefore pool the data for symmetric sets of signals and measure the power of sunspots by how distant the chosen actions were from 50.
If extrinsic signals affect behavior, they must raise the average distance of choices from 50. is not just the secure action, but it is also the riskdominant equilibrium, results from level-k reasoning, and is the unique symmetric 16 In treatments CP and CC, symmetry refers to playing m when both signals are 0, 100-m when both signals are 100. When the two signals are different in CP, symmetry means playing n when the public signal is 0 and the private signal is 100, and 100-n when the public signal is 100 and the private signal is 0. For two distinct public signals in Treatment CC, symmetry prescribes playing 50 as in Treatment N. equilibrium according to the theory of focal points by Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2008) . 17 The average distance of actions from 50 in Treatment N was 0.81 and all groups but one converged according to the strong convergence criterion. But even in the remaining group, the failure to achieve strong convergence was only due to one subject who deviated during the last four periods after being perfectly coordinated with all other group members on the risk-dominant equilibrium from the first period onwards. In total, 22 out of 36 subjects in Treatment N chose "50" in the first period, and 13 of them stuck to this strategy during the entire session. Thus, in the absence of public signals, it seems natural to converge to the risk- 
Non-sunspot and sunspot equilibria
Sunspot-Driven Behavior without Public Signals
Despite the different noise structures, theory prescribes that behavior in Treatments P75, P95, and AC should be the same as in Treatment N: subjects should ignore their signals, in which case we expect the chosen actions will converge to 50. Figure 2 plots the average distance to 50 in blocks of 10 periods for all groups in P75, P95, and AC. In Treatment P75 all groups converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Treatments P95 and AC displayed some heterogeneity among groups. Some groups quickly converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium, while in other groups subjects seemed to condition choices on their private signals.
The most interesting finding in Treatments P95 and AC is the behavior of groups who did not converge to an equilibrium: the emergence of sunspot-driven nonequilibrium behavior.
Unlike the theoretical prediction, highly precise private signals may not only impede coordination, but may also lead to coordination on non-equilibrium strategies. In Treatment P95, private signals affected behavior in three groups (Groups 13, 14, and 18) throughout the game and diverted actions away from the risk-dominant equilibrium. Groups 13 and 14 coordinated on 10/90. In two groups of Treatment AC (Groups 22 and 24), subjects conditioned their behavior on the signal when it was available and otherwise chose 50. Both groups converged to the sunspot-driven nonequilibrium strategy 0/100. Hence, when the correlation between private signals is high, sunspot-driven behavior can emerge. This is in contradiction to equilibrium theory which describes a discontinuous behavior, meaning that as long as the signals are imprecise, sunspot equilibria do not exist. and N (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.01, one-sided). Thus, at least for treatment P95, we can reject the hypothesis that private signals do not affect behavior. The reason for the low significance of AC is that four out of six groups converged to the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Thus, the median distance was about the same as in Treatments N and P75.
In Table 3 we present evidence from panel regressions. The dependent variable is the distance to 50, which is regressed on treatment dummies for P75, P95, and AC (Treatment N serves as the baseline). 20 Note that controlling for the period or the behavior of the opponent in the previous period does not affect the qualitative results. The results in column 1 confirm the nonparametric tests, albeit the difference between P75 and N is significant at the 5% level. Looking at the first 20 periods (column 2) we see that treatment effects emerge in the early periods but get smaller over time (column 3). 19 If not indicated otherwise, all results obtained by using the Mann-Whitney test are robust to using the robust rank-order test. 20 For Treatment AC, the regression is based on data from informed subjects only. Hypothesis H4 claims that the distance of actions from the risk-dominant equilibrium is independent of the probability that another player receives the same signal. Figure 3 indicates that this is not the case. It compares the average distance of choices from 50 across treatments. Recall that for any subject receiving one signal, the probability that the other subject sees the same signal is 62.5% in Treatment P75, 90% in AC, 90.5% in P95, and 100% in Treatment C. The impression that the distance rises in the aforementioned probability is partially confirmed by a two-sided Wald test in the panel regression: the coefficients on treatment dummies P75 and P95 differ significantly. However, nonparametric tests cannot reject that the distance in Treatment P95 is the same as in P75 (Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.13, one-sided). P-values are even higher for a comparison between P75 and AC. In Treatment C, the average distance is significantly higher than in all treatments without a public signal. The respective p-values are all below 2%.
The Effects of Multiple Signals
In this section, we focus on the treatments with two signals, CC and CP. In both treatments, the available signals can generate sunspot equilibria. As previously shown in Table 2 , subjects coordinated on following the mean of both signals in Treatment CC, while there were convergence patterns to three different equilibria in Treatment CP. 21 The most immediate observation from Treatment CP is that all groups but one departed from playing In the first period, 32% of all subjects chose 50, 42% followed the public signal, and 60% of decisions were consistent with choosing the mean. Only one group (Group 33) resorted to the risk-dominant equilibrium and neglected both signals from early periods onwards. Five groups (Group 34, 37, 38, 40, and 42) followed the public signal as in Treatment C. Of the remaining six groups, at least three converged to an intermediate sunspot equilibrium in which subjects chose 25 whenever Y=0
and 75 when Y=100. 23 Note that "25/75" is the maximin response to any nondegenerate distribution of the three popular strategies that subjects played in the first period. This may explain why some groups converged to this particular sunspot equilibrium. Treatment CP equals the power of a private signal without a coexisting public signal.
The evidence from Treatment CP shows that the effect of signals is not additive.
While a single private or public signal does not prevent coordination, coordination becomes considerably more difficult if the two signals are displayed simultaneously. Despite some variance, convergence to an equilibrium takes a surprisingly long time, if it happens at all.
This fact was exemplified by the three groups that never coordinated their actions. In Treatment CP, a subject needed to learn that (i) the private signal should be ignored and (ii) it may be good to condition one's action on the public signal, even though it is intrinsically as irrelevant as the private signal. Apparently, this learning process takes longer than learning only one of these points in the other treatments.
Welfare
The previous results clearly show that different information structures induce very different behavior. We have seen that purely public information reliably generates sunspot equilibria whereas, for instance, no information or imprecise private information leads to the riskdominant equilibrium. For welfare considerations, it does not matter which equilibrium is eventually chosen. Hence, following or neglecting sunspots need not affect welfare. What matters, however, is whether and how fast subjects converge to an equilibrium. If a certain information structure results in a slower convergence process, we observe frequent miscoordination in the early periods and thus welfare losses.
The obvious welfare measure that we use throughout this section is the group's average payoff. Table 4 displays the average payoffs in the different treatments for the first 20 periods, for the last 20 periods, and for all periods. For statistical support we ran nonparametric tests based on all 80 periods. This gives us a rigorous test of possible welfare effects, since it requires long periods of miscoordination to generate significant differences in Note: For the nonparametric tests in this table, a matching group is treated as independent observation and Treatments P75, P95, AC, and C are compared to Treatment N, whereas Treatments CP, and CC are compared to C. Significance levels are based on Mann-Whitney tests (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The results are robust to using the robust rank-order test.
average payoffs over all periods. 25 Comparing payoffs in Treatments N, C, and CC, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average payoffs over all periods are the same (Mann-Whitney tests, p > 0.30, two-sided).
Thus, extrinsic public signals per se do not appear to be detrimental for welfare. In Treatment P75, initial payoffs were lower. But since subjects learned to ignore their signals rather quickly, the payoffs over all periods are comparable to Treatment N (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.13, two-sided).
In the treatments with highly correlated private signals, P95 and AC, the average payoffs over all periods are significantly smaller than in Treatment N (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.01 and p = 0.025 respectively). In Treatment P95, this is mainly due to the late convergence-but also to the two groups who coordinated on a nonequilibrium strategy. In Treatment AC, the convergence time was comparable to Treatment C. Here, the lower average payoffs were due to the two groups who converged to a nonequilibrium strategy.
The probability of not receiving a signal in Treatment AC was small (10%), but the associated losses were so large that they reduced average payoffs significantly.
Finally, we can reject the null hypothesis for equal means in Treatments C and CP (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.04, robust-rank order test, p = 0.1, both tests two sided) and in Treatments N and CP (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.01, two-sided). Comparing the average payoffs in Treatment CP with Treatments P95 and AC, we find no significant differences (MannWhitney, p > 0.1, two-sided). We summarize these findings in the following result. 25 We obtained the same results by running random-effects GLS regressions on individual payoffs. The fact that average payoffs over all periods in Treatments CP were lower than in P75 (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.01, two-sided) and C and similar to those in Treatments P95 and AC shows that the welfare effects of imprecise private signals are larger when combined with a public signal. This is true, even though we rejected the hypothesis that private signals have a different power as measured by their effect on the distance between choices and the risk-dominant equilibrium. A possible explanation is the reduced power of public signals.
While in Treatment C public signals are so powerful that they lead to a fast coordination on the salient sunspot equilibrium, this power is partially lost if other salient messages are present that should be ignored. Figure 6 relates each group's average payoff conditional on the signal combination to the average distance of actions from 50 and reveals an interesting U-shaped pattern. The figure also displays the prediction (fitted line) from a regression of average group payoffs on average distance and squared average distance along with the 95% confidence interval to visualize this U-shaped pattern.
Groups that converged quickly to the risk-dominant equilibrium achieved almost the maximum payoff of 200 points. In Treatments C and CC, salient public signals were so powerful that subjects quickly coordinated on a sunspot equilibrium, resulting in payoffs that were also close to the maximum ( points, respectively. These payoffs were considerably lower than in any other information condition and treatment.
The relation of payoffs to the power of sunspots has its counterpart in convergence time. For treatments in which sunspots have low power (measured by the average distance to 50), convergence to a common sunspot-driven strategy takes longer than in sessions with highly powerful sunspots. Table 5 summarizes the median period of convergence for the Change of average distance and payoff from first to second half of Treatment CP average payoff Note: "negative" indicates the number of first period choices violating the symmetry conditions. These choices are smaller than 50 when the (public) signal is 100 or vice versa. For the non-parametric tests in this table each subject's decision is treated as an independent observation. P75, P95, AC, and C are compared to N, whereas CP and CC are compared to C. Significance levels are based on Mann-Whitney tests (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
with average distances between about 15 and 35 in the first half of the experiment seem to converge towards a 25/75 sunspot equilibrium (indicated by the large circle at the upper edge of Figure 7 ) during the second half of the experiment.
Behavior in the First Period
Looking at the initial choices made during the first period is interesting, because we know from previous experiments on coordination games, such as Beil (1990, 1991) , that first period behavior largely determines to which equilibrium subjects converge. Table 6 summarizes distances between the subjects' initial choices and the riskdominant equilibrium, disaggregated by treatments. In Treatment N about 60% of all subjects chose 50 from the spot. Introducing private signals substantially reduced the number of subjects who chose the risk-dominant equilibrium in favor of subjects following their signal. In Treatments P75, P95, and AC, we find that about 35% of subjects were close to the risk-dominant equilibrium and about the same number followed their signals. In treatments with public signals, the effects were reversed: in Treatments C and CP with equal signals, about 60% followed their signals. In treatments in which different groups converged to different strategies (AC, P95, and CP), the distance to the risk-dominant equilibrium during the first periods was closely related to the eventual convergence points -despite the fact that convergence in these treatments took more than 30 periods on average. Figure 8 plots the average distance to 50 in the first and last five periods for all groups of these treatments. In Treatments AC and P95, the average distance to 50 over the first five periods in groups converging to the riskdominant equilibrium is significantly lower than in groups converging to nonequilibrium sunspot behavior p < 0.01, Moreover, the correlation between the average distance in the first five and the last five periods is highly significant (Spearman's = 0. 2, p < 0.01) . A similar pattern holds for Treatment CP. Again, the correlation between the distance in the first and last five periods is highly significant (Spearman's = 0.84, p < 0.01) . In groups converging to the sunspot equilibrium 0/100, the subjects quickly followed the public signal, and we can reject the hypothesis that the average distance from 50 during the first five periods in these groups is the same as in the other groups p < 0.03, 
B. Symmetry of Actions
In this section we analyze whether actions played during the experiment are symmetric, that is whether a subject choosing m a i when she receives signal s = 0 also chooses m a i 100 when receiving signal s = 100. Symmetry allows us to measure the power of sunspots by the distance of chosen actions from 50, independent of whether signals are 0 or 100.
Note that for treatments with two signals, symmetry refers to playing m when both signals are 0 and 100-m when both signals are 100. When the two signals are different in CP, symmetry means playing n when the public signal is 0 and the private signal is 100, and 100-n when the public signal is 100 and the private signal is 0. For two distinct public signals in Treatment CC, symmetry prescribes playing 50 as in situations without signals. To test the symmetry of strategies we estimate the following model:
The dependent variable is the decision of individual i. We transform this variable to
when the private signal is s = 100 (as in P75, P95, and AC), when the public signal is s = 100 (as in C and CP), or when the public signal Y1 is s = 100 (as in CC). Thus the dependent variable ait always measures the distance to zero irrespective of the signal realization. As independent variables we include "Period" to control for the time trend and a dummy variable, "S100", which equals 1 if the private signal equals 100 (in P75, P95, or AC) or the public signal equals 100 (in C, CP, or Y1 in CC). For Treatment AC, we consider only observations in which the random number Z was revealed to the subjects. For Treatments CP and CC we estimate separate regressions for equal signals
. For Treatment CC, we also test whether the constant equals 50, which amounts to both public signals having the same impact on behavior.
The regression results are displayed in Table B1 . We only report the results of a random effects model as specified in (B1) in which we control for repeated decisions of the same subject as well as for dependencies within matching groups. Alternatively, we used a simple OLS model with clustering at the group level, which does not impose any restriction on the correlation within groups. Our variable of interest is the dummy for the signal "S100".
If decisions are symmetric, the coefficient i should be close to zero and insignificant.
Indeed we observe for treatments P75, P95, C and CC that the coefficient for "S100" is not significantly different from zero. The same is true for treatment CP when the signals are equal. In CP with unequal signals and in AC we find that "S100" is significant at the 5%-level, but numerically small. This is mainly due to one matching group in each of the two treatments. If we exclude these two groups the coefficient for "S100" is insignificant in both regressions. The OLS regressions with clustering at the group level yield insignificant coefficients in all treatments (including all groups). Notes: T4 denotes the earliest period from which at least 4 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±3. T6 denotes the earliest period from which all 6 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±1. The avg. coordination rate is the percentage of pairs choosing the same action within a range of ±1 over all periods. Notes: T4 denotes the earliest period from which at least 4 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±3. T6 denotes the earliest period from which all 6 subjects play the same strategy until the last but one period, allowing a deviation of ±1. The avg. coordination rate is the percentage of pairs choosing the same action within a range of ±1 over all periods.
D. Sample Instructions for Treatment CP
The experiment in which you are participating is part of a research project. Its aim is to analyze economic decision behavior.
The experiment consists of 80 periods in total. The rules and instructions are the same for all participants. In each period, you have to make a decision. All periods are completely independent. Your income from the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions made by the other participants. Please read all instructions carefully and thoroughly.
Please note that you are not permitted to speak to the other participants or to exchange information with them for the duration of the entire experiment. Should you have a question, please raise your hand, and we will come to you and answer your question. Please do not ask your question(s) in a loud voice. Should you breach these rules, we will be forced to exclude you from the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw 10 of the 80 periods, which will become relevant for your payoff. Your payoff will then be determined according to the sum of your earnings from these selected periods. In addition, you will receive 3 Euro for participating in the experiment.
Description of the Experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, three groups of six participants each are randomly and anonymously formed. These groups remain unaltered for the entire experiment. At no point are you told who is in your group.
In each period, you are randomly and anonymously paired with another participant from your group (referred to as your partner from now on). This means that you can be paired with the same participant from your group several times in the course of the experiment, albeit not in two successive periods. Neither you nor your partner is told the other's identity.
Information at the Beginning of Each Period
At the beginning of each period, the computer randomly draws a number Z. The number Z is equally likely either to have the value 0 or 100. This means that in 5 out of 10 cases, on average, the number Z takes the value 0, and in 5 out of 10 cases, it takes the value 100. The number Z is the same for you and your partner.
At the time of the decision, the number Z is not known. Instead, you receive two independent hints for the number Z:
Shared hint Y:
You and your partner both receive a shared hint Y for the number Z. This hint can be either 0 or 100 and is randomly determined. With a probability of 75%, hint Y has the same value as the number Z. With the remaining probability of 25%, the hint will have the other value. The shared hint is the same for both of you.
Private hint X:
In addition to the shared hint Y, you will receive a private hint X for the number Z. Your partner also receives a private hint X.
The private hint can be either 0 or 100 and is randomly determined. With a probability of 75%, the private hint X has the same value as the number Z. With the remaining probability of 25%, the private hint X will have the other value.
Your private hint and the private hint of your partner are independently drawn, i.e., both private hints can be different. You are not told which private hint your partner has received, and your partner is not told which private hint you have received.
If the shared and the private hint are the same, the probability of both being correct is 90 percent. In other words, if you have received two similar hints, then in 9 out of 10 cases these correspond to the number Z.
If the shared and the private hint are different, then both values of the number Z are equally probable.
Your Decision
In each period, you have to decide on a number between 0 and 100 (incl. 0 and 100). Once you have made your decision, you have to click on the OK button on the corresponding computer screen. Once all participants have made their binding decisions, a period is finished.
Your Earnings
Your earnings depend on how close your decision has come to your partner's decision. The distance is squared, so that higher distance leads to a disproportionate loss compared to a smaller distance. The closer your decision is to your partner's decision, the higher your earnings are.
The following table gives you an overview of possible earnings. In this table, only distances in steps of 20 are shown. Please note that distances may be any integer between 0 and 100. In the table, you can also see that you are able to earn a maximum of 200 Euro cents (top-left field) and a minimum of 0 Euro cents (bottom-right field). 
